h1. Goals

The nuclear use case will be run through a simulation environment, which will stimulate the event-processing platform with virtual events coming from web-services playing the role of involved partners (police, army, meteorological service, radiation survey networks, etc.). EMAC will lead that use case and represent the interface to the real end users.

h1. Approach

A nuclear accident may occur in a nuclear plant or during the carriage of radioactive material. These industrial plant or those hazardous material transports may expose people to ionizing radiations according to large quantity of radioactive substance accidentally released in the atmosphere, or critical accident with strong nuclear radiation due to an uncontrolled fission (which may also include a large radioactive substance release similar to previous point).
The scenario is proposed according to four steps:
# *{_}Alert step{_}*: The plant security system (and maybe the radiation survey network) detects a potential problem and send an alert event (critical accident due to an uncontrolled fission with a large radioactive substance release). The Local responsible of the nuclear plant diagnoses that it is a crisis situation and send the events to convoke or mobilize the required actors.
# *{_}Deployment step{_}*: Actors arrive on the expected places (site, management cell) and start to deploy and make an inventory of resources. Meteorological network and radiation survey network keep on sending their measures as events.
# *{_}Reaction step{_}*: Actors on site provide their first diagnostics (as events), while the mobilized scientific cell provides its first advices (as events) based on weather and radiation measurements. The management cell creates the decision workflow (in order to respect hierarchy and expertise) and determines some priority build and start to run on the crisis field.
# *{_}Continuous step{_}*: The situation evolves and the three workflows have to remain adapted to the situation. This objective may be reached according to two levels:
#* *Micro level*: Each actor send continuously its events and receive the (possibly complex) events it is concerned by (for instance, the scientific cell listen to the meteorological and radiation events, while logistic of firemen listen to road network events). Each workflow (strategic, operational and support) may so evolve continuously at a micro level according to these events.
#* *Macro level*: Some complex events conjunction may require some strong changes in the workflows (for instance, a panic movement among people of the nearest city or a sudden change in the weather which may impact critical ground water). In this case, the management cell should use the management system of the platform to control situation and the consequences on the workflows.

h1. Scenario description


h2. Iterative principle of demo

This part provides some explanations concerning the two steps of the demo dedicated to cover all the identified objectives (suggested objectives are: orchestration, choreography, agility in orchestration, agility in choreography, scalability).
Though it is not easy to imagine this context as a strongly computed environment where services could easily send their events to the clouds, many elements make this use case a relevant illustration for Internet of Services:
* The simulation platform enable to run independent internal business processes _(orchestration)_,
* The simulation platform links various processes, which are running on separate ESB _(choreography)_,
* It can takes into account changes in a single process _(agility in orchestration)_,
* It can take into account the interaction between processes and modify each impacted process if needed _(agility in choreography)_. Those changes are driven by events,
* High volumes of heterogeneous information is exchanged _(scalability)_.

The scenarios will therefore take those considerations into account. They include elements, which enable to demonstrate that SocEDA platform can handle such a complex situation. Two scenarios are described:
* One scenario fairly simple, with a limited number of information exchanged and only few changes in orchestration and no change in choreography. This scenario aims at giving a simple example of how the simulation platform is running. To keep this scenario as simple as possible, only some of the activities presented in the first part of this document are detailed and implemented.
* A second scenario, much more complex, with many changes and exchanges of information. This scenario aims at demonstrating that SocEDA platform can be used in such a complex situation, with great advantages, such as quickness, reactivity and agility.
For those scenarios, we chose a situation, where evacuation of population is recommended.
For information, French legislation recommends:
* To stay indoors if the cumulative dose rate is above 10 mSv.
* To evacuate if the cumulative dose rate is above 50 mSv.
* To ingest iodine capsules if the cumulative dose rate is above 50 mSv. This level has been changed recently to align with international standards.

h2. First Scenario

We consider in this scenario a simple case, where the evacuation of population goes smoothly. There are no victims, no change in wind force or direction, no rain, nor any alert regarding radioactivity level.
Nuclear Plant teams detect a leak between primary and secondary loops, thanks to the alert given by a high pressure sensor in the primary loop. The throttle valve is open and does not respond to losing order, so the teams realize that there is a risk of radioactive leakage in the atmosphere. They alert the responsible of the nuclear plant.
All actions taken within the plant are out of the scope of this study, so from this point, we focus on decisions, operations and support activities outside the plant.
The responsible of the nuclear plant informs the representative of the national authority, who activates the PPI in reflex mode. He also informs the representative of EDF national. A crisis cell is formed.



The crisis cell alerts field actors (firemen, police, army, office of infrastructure…) and ask the radiation survey network (RSN) and Meteo France (MF) for measurements. It alerts the media and set off the siren so that the population can learn that they have to stay indoors and listen to media.
Field actors are ready to deploy.
Regular updates are given to the media, and then to the population. Every 15 minutes, a new point of the situation is provided.
Regular measurements are sent by MF and RSN. Every 15 minutes, actual measures are sent by both MF and RSN. Every 30 minutes, experts from MF forecast the weather, in order to anticipate any change in wind force and direction or any precipitation.
Measurements in this scenario are as follow :
\*Radioactivity :
* \* Forecasted dose rate after 1day: 60 mSv/j during the first 24h
* \* Measured dose rate : starts at 1µSv/h at 1 km, then decreases (0,3 µSv/h after 1h, 0,2 µSv/h after 3h, 0,15µSv/h after 5h).
* Wind Force : 5 m/s constant
* Wind direction : NE
* Precipitation : none
Those measurements are stored in the data warehouse.

With the measurements received from Meteo France and the radiation survey network (RSN), the crisis cell ask for advice from scientific experts at IRSN. They analyse all figures available and advise to evacuate population living close to the nuclear plant (within 10km). No confinement order is issued.
The crisis cell, following those recommendations, defines both a safety parameter and a circulation plan. They ask for their implementation. This is implemented by the army.
Field actors receive the circulation plan and the safety parameter defined. They are asked to implement them.
The office of infrastructures provides road signs and vehicles to implement the circulation plan.
The logistics section of the police sends resources to implement the evacuation perimeter. The Police use those resources to make sure that the population evacuates.
To facilitate the evacuation, the representative of the local authority requisitions buses and send them meeting points.
The media inform the population that everybody closer than 10km of the nuclear plant has to evacuate. Instructions are that people with light vehicles can use them and leave, if possible with 4 or 5 person per vehicle. Others can go to assembly points. Children at school are evacuated directly from their school.
The army patrol and control that there is no problem during evacuation.
Despite all efforts to avoid any further complication, a traffic jam occurs along one of the main roads. Indeed, some of the population outside this perimeter decided to leave as well, which incurred a higher number of vehicles than expected. There are no victims, but the road is blocked.
The police inform the crisis cell.
The crisis cell defines another circulation plan, and sends this new plan to the office of infrastructures. They implement it quickly, so no traffic jam occurs.
The army checks that everybody managed to evacuate safely. They confirm that everything is ok and informs the crisis cell.
As no change measures form Meteo France and RSN are foreseen, operations are closed.

h2. Second Scenario

We consider in this scenario a complex case, where the evacuation of population is required and does not go as smoothly as planned. There are some victims, changes in wind force and direction, and rain.
The root cause of the accident remains the same: Nuclear Plant teams detect a leak between primary and secondary loops, thanks to the alert given by a high pressure sensor in the primary loop. The throttle valve is open and does not respond to closing order, so the teams realize that there is a risk of radioactive leakage in the atmosphere. They alert the responsible of the nuclear plant.
There again, all actions taken within the plant are out of the scope of this study, so from this point, we focus on decisions, operations and support activities outside the plant.
Some of the activities presented in the scenario 1 are kept, other are added due to this complex situation.

The responsible of the nuclear plant informs the representative of the national authority, who activates the PPI in reflex mode. He also informs the representative of EDF national. A crisis cell is formed.

The crisis cell alerts field actors (firemen, police, army, office of infrastructure…) and ask the radiation survey network (RSN) and Meteo France (MF) for measurements. It alerts the media and set off the siren so that the population can learn that they have to stay indoors and listen to media.
Field actors are ready to deploy.
Regular updates are given to the media, and then to the population. Every 3 minutes, a new point of the situation is provided.
Regular measurements are sent by MF and RSN. Every minute, actual measures are sent by both MF and RSN. Every 10 minutes, experts from MF forecast the weather, in order to anticipate any change in wind force and direction or any precipitation.
* Forecasted dose rate :
* \* step 1 : between 10 and 49 mSv/h
* \* step 2 : between 50 and 100 mSv/j
* Wind Force : 5 m/s at first.
* Wind direction : NE
* Rain : 2mm/h
Those measurements are stored in the data warehouse.

*Step 1 :*
With the measurements received from Meteo France and the radiation survey network (RSN), the crisis cell asks for advice from scientific experts at IRSN. They analyse all figures available and advise first to ask population to stay indoors (within 5km).
The media inform the population that everybody closer than 5km of the nuclear plant has to stay indoors.
The crisis cell, following those recommendations, defines a safety parameter.
They ask for its implementation.
Field actors receive the safety parameter defined. They are asked to implement it.
The army sends resources to implement the safety perimeter. Those resources are used to make sure that the safety perimeter is respected.

*Step 2 :*
After 15 minutes, as radioactive measures are still increasing, a higher dose rate is forecasted.
IRSN sends a new advice to evacuate population living close to the nuclear plant (within 10km), and ask population living between 10 and 20km to stay indoors. Everybody being closer than 10km for the nuclear plant has to ingest iodine capsules.
The crisis cell, following those recommendations, defines both a new safety parameter and a circulation plan. They ask for their implementation. They also inform media about those new recommendations for population.
The cloud proposes to the army to subscribe to events of the type “status of operations”. Indeed, this type of event was often consulted by them. The Army accepts and add this new subscription.
Field actors receive the order to distribute iodine capsules. They also receive the circulation plan and the new safety parameter defined. They are asked to implement them.
The logistics section of firemen provides vehicles and iodine capsule.
The office of infrastructures provides road signs and vehicles to implement the circulation plan.
The army sends resources to implement the safety perimeter. Those resources are used to make sure that the safety perimeter is respected.
To facilitate the evacuation, the representative of the local authority requisitions buses and send them meeting points.
The media inform the population that everybody closer than 10km of the nuclear plant has to ingest iodine and evacuate. Instructions are that people with light vehicles can use them and leave, if possible with 4 or 5 person per vehicle. Others can go to assembly points. Children at school are evacuated directly from their school.
Firemen and MEMS are sent with iodine capsules, to distribute iodine to those, who do not have capsules already at home. Drugstores also supply iodine capsules.
The army ensures and controls that the evacuation goes smoothly.
Despite all efforts to avoid any further complication, a road accident occurs along one of the main roads. Three people are hurt and require assistance.
The police, who was nearby, inform the crisis cell.
The crisis cell defines another circulation plan, and sends this new plan to the office of infrastructures for implementation. By the time they implement it, a traffic jam occurs. An alert is sent.
An adaptation is required: the army, who is not supposed to be involved in iodine distribution, has to take part in the process.
The army checks that everybody managed to evacuate. They find that it is not going easily, and a traffic jam occurred along the main road.
They inform the crisis cell. Six cars and one bus had an accident. Firemen are sent to assist victims. An alternative circulation plan is defined. The crisis cell asks for its implementation.
Firemen send an alert to the cloud: their resources are not sufficient to cover both iodine distribution and victim assistance. MEMS are too far away to take over victim assistance, so somebody has to replace firemen for iodine distribution.
The office of infrastructures provides new road signs and vehicles to implement the new circulation plan. They remove the old signs to take into account the new plan.
Victims are transferred to hospital by firemen. Hospital receives and treats victims. Crisis cell decided to send MEMS to support psychologically the people around the accident.
The army checks again that everybody managed to evacuate. They confirm that everything is ok and informs the crisis cell.
As no change measures form Meteo France and RSN are foreseen, operations are closed. Every actors create and send its reports on operations. Reports are aggregated by the communication officer. This final report is used by media to inform populations.



h1. BPMN 2.0 process

*61 BPMN 2.0 processes* are defined in the nuclear crisis use case. These processes are divided in 18 groups (similar types):
* 6 groups at decisional level,
* 9 groups at operational level,
* 3 groups au support level.
Below, an excerpt of these processes are presented:
* +Example of decisional process+
!decision.png|border=1!
* +Example of operational process+
!operation.png|border=1!